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Criminal Law and Procedure
Dale E. Bennett*
CRIMINAL LAW
SUFFICIENCY OF DEFINITION OF CRIME
The language used in a criminal statute must be sufficiently
definite to enable a reader of ordinary intelligence to determine
what conduct is proscribed.' There is not, nor can there be, a
clearcut line between sufficent definition and unconstitutional
vagueness in criminal statutes. The distinction can best be
drawn, but then only in a rough sort of way, by an examination
of the decisions in borderline cases. For example, the Supreme
Court has declared that the phrases "to prospect,"'2 "mechanical
devices,"3 "lewd or indecent act,' 4 and "sexually indecent print"5
have sufficiently well-understood meanings, in the context of the
statutes involved, to satisfy the requirements of criminal law
definition. On the other hand, the phrases "immoral act,"' 6 "satis-
factory explanation, ' 7 and "indecent print"" have been deemed
to be unconstitutionally vague as used in the statutes then be-
*Professor of Law, Louisiana State University. The work of Daniel J. McGee,
Associate Editor of the Louisiana Law Review, in the preparation of these ma-
terials is gratefully acknowledged.
1. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10; Shreveport v. Brewer, 225 La. 93, 72 So.2d 308
(1954) ; State v. Kraft, 214 La. 351, 37 So.2d 815 (1948).
2. State v. Evans, 214 La. 472, 38 So.2d 140 (1948), upholding the constitu-
tionality of Act 212 of 1934, which made it unlawful to "prospect" by certain
specified means or "any mechanical device" for oil and minerals on private or
public lands without the consent of the appropriate party.
3. Ibid.
4. Shreveport v. Wilson, 145 La. 906, 83 So. 186 (1919), upholding a city
ordinance which made it unlawful "to use or occupy any hotel, house, room or
other building or place for the purpose of prostitution, assignation or other lewd
or indecent act, in the city of Shreveport."
5. State v. Roth, 226 La. 1, 74 So.2d 392 (1954), holding that LA. R.S.
14:106(2) (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1950, No. 314, § 1, p. 511, which defines
obscenity as "possession with the intent to display .. . sexually indecent print"
was constitutional.
6. State v. Truby, 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758 (1947), ruling on LA. R.S.
14:104 (1950), which reads: "Keeping a disorderly place is the intentional main-
taining of a place to be used habitually for any illegal purpose or for any immoral
sexual purpose."
7. Shreveport v. Brewer, 225 La. 93, 72 So.2d 308 (1954), holding that a city
ordinance which provided penalties for those "who shall be on the streets of the
city after midnight without a satisfactory explanation" was not sufficiently
definite.
8. State v. Kraft, 214 La. 351, 37 So.2d 815 (1948), holding LA. R.S.
14:106(2) (1950), which defined obscenity, before the 1950 amendment, as "pos-
session with the intent to display ...any indecent print" to be insufficient.
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fore the court. Necessarily, the question is one of degree and
common sense. In State v. Murtes,9 the Supreme Court consid-
ered the constitutionality of R.S. 48:422 which prohibited cer-
tain state officials from being "in any way interested" in any
contract for the building of any highway or other specified state
construction. Reasoning that the language could be interpreted
to include an interest based on sentimental or ethical considera-
tions alone, the court held that the quoted part of the statute was
unconstitutionally vague. This holding re-emphasizes the Su-
preme Court's position that a very high degree of definiteness is
required in criminal statutes. The reasoning in the Murtes case
is analogous to the court's reasoning in State v. Trubyl0 that an
article of the Criminal Code, defining keeping a disorderly place
as maintaining a place for habitual use for any "immoral" pur-
pose, was unconstitutionally vague and indefinite because "the
language employed is of such vague and indefinite import that
it might embrace many acts which could not possibly have any
criminal character, and leaves the discrimination between these
and others to arbitrary judicial discretion."1 1
In State v. Marsh,'2 the defendants argued that the simple
escape statute under which they had been convicted was uncon-
stitutional because of the indefiniteness of the following ital-
icized phrases: "Simple escape is the intentional departure of a
person, under circumstances wherein human life is not endan-
gered, from lawful custody of any officer ... or from any place
where he is lawfully detained by any officer."'18 In affirming the
conviction the court declared that the words used "taken accord-
ing to their fair import, in their usual common or ordinary
meaning, in connection with the context, and with reference to
the purposes to be served' 1 4 were not unconstitutionally vague.
THEFT - PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
Article 67 of the Criminal Code defines theft as the taking of
anything of value which belongs "to another." The case of State
v. Peterson15 presented the novel question 6 of whether commer-
9. 232 La. 486, 94 So.2d 446 (1957).
10. 211 La. 178, 29 So.2d 758 (1947).
11. 211 La. 178, 203, 29 So.2d 758, 766 (1947), quoting with approval from
State v. Gaster, 45 La. Ann. 636, 646, 12 So. 739, 743 (1893).
12. 96 So.2d 643 (La. 1957).
13. LA. R.S. 14:110 (1950), as amended, La. Acts 1954, No. 122, p. 214.
14. 96 So.2d 643, 646 (La. 1957).
15. 232 La. 931, 95 So.2d 608 (1957), 18 LOuISIANA LAW REvzw 182 (1957).
16. In the case of State v. Hogg, 126 La. 1053, 53 So. 225 (1910), decided
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cial partnership property is subject to theft by one of the part-
ners as property "of another." In the Peterson case, one of the
partners in a commercial partnership had allegedly withdrawn
money from the partnership bank account for the purpose of
converting the funds to his personal use. In the prosecution of
the partner for theft, the trial judge sustained a motion to quash
the bill of information on the ground that it did not charge the
crime of theft since the property taken was not the property "of
another" as to the defendant partner. The Supreme Court, two
Justices dissenting, affirmed the action of the trial judge. The
majority of the court reasoned that since each partner in a com-
mercial partnership can be held liable for the entire debt of the
partnership, 17 there was such an identity of the partners and the
partnership that the requirement of Article 67 that the property
taken be that "of another" was not satisfied. The dissenting
Justices would have held commercial partnership property to be
the property "of another" as to the individual partners on the
theory that a partnership is a separate legal entity, distinct from
the individuals composing it. The dissenters' position would ap-
pear to have merit from a practical, as well as a technical, stand-
point. Partners in a commercial partnership need protection of
their property from misappropriation by one of the partners,
just as the individual needs protection as to his property which
may have been entrusted to another for use or management. It
is true, as pointed out in the majority opinion in the Peterson
case, that a partner may sue for an accounting and a dissolution
of the partnership when he believes that another partner is ap-
propriating partnership property to his own use. However, if
the defrauding partner has disposed of the property this may
prove to be an empty remedy. Furthermore, every person has a
civil right of action against a thief to recover the value of the
property taken from him, but this has never been deemed a suf-
ficient reason not to impose criminal sanctions upon the thief.
From a purely legalistic standpoint, there is ample authority for
treating commercial partnership property as the property "of
another" within the contemplation of Article 67. Article 2 of the
Criminal Code, which defines terms used in the Code, provides
that " 'another' refers to any other person or legal entity."'8 It
before the adoption of the Criminal Code, the court stated in dicta that a partner
could not be guilty of embezzling the property of the partnership of which he is
a member.
17. LA. CIViL CODE art. 2872 (1870).
18. In the Reporter's comment to this provision it is stated that "in view of
the method of use of [this] expression in the Code, it is extremely important that
19571
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is firmly established in the jurisprudence that a partnership "is
an abstract ideal being with legal relations separate and distinct
from those of its individual members" '1 9 and that "partners are
not the owners of the partnership property [but rather] the
ideal being... is the owner." 20 By giving full effect to the entity
concept of partnerships the Louisiana court could have imposed
criminal liability upon a partner who misappropriates commer-
cial partnership property.
The court in the Peterson case seems to have based its de-
cision on the fact that each partner in a commercial partnership
can be held liable for the entire debt of the partnership. This
implies that a different result might be reached in a case involv-
ing the misappropriation of property belonging to an ordinary
partnership by one of the partners, since ordinary partners are
liable only for their virile share of the debts of the partnership.21
Whether the partnership is commercial or ordinary, the practical
and legal considerations are essentially the same, and it is highly
doubtful that such a distinction will be made or could be justi-
fied.
GUILTY KNOWLEDGE AS A ELEMENT OF CRIME..
The 1955 case of State v. Johnson2 2 held (on rehearing) that
"guilty knowledge is an essential ingredient of the crime of pos-
session of narcotic drugs, '23 despite the fact that the statute
denouncing the possession of narcotics as unlawful 24 makes no
mention of criminal intent or knowledge. Following the Johnson
decision, there was speculation as to whether the court meant
that knowledge of the fact of possession would suffice, or
whether the offender must have a guilty mind (mens rea) in the
sense that he realizes that the substance is a narcotic.2 5 The
court's language in the recent case of State v. Birdsell26 indicates
that the court requires something more than mere knowledge
[it] be taken to include as much as possible" and "only by an extensive interpre-
tation will [its] purpose be served."
19. Trappey v. Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co., 229 La. 632, 635, 86 So.2d
515, 516 (1956), holding that a partner may recover workmen's compensation from
a partnership of which he is a member.
20. Smith v. McMicken, 3 La. Ann. 319, 322 (1848), quoted with approval in
Succession of Pilcher, 39 La. Ann. 362, 365, 1 So. 929, 932 (1887).
21. LA. CIVIL CODE art. 2872 (1870).
22. 228 La. 317, 82 So.2d 24 (1955), 17 LOUISIANA LAW REvIEW 229 (1956).
23. 228 La. 317, 334, 82 So.2d 24, 30 (1955).
24. LA. R.S. 40:962A (1950).
25. See The Work of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1954-1955 Term -
Criminal Law and Procedure, 17 LouISIANA LAW REVIEW 229 (1956).
26. 232 La. 725, 95 So.2d 290 (1957).
[Vol. XVIII
CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
of the fact of possession. One subsection of the narcotics statute
makes it unlawful to possess a hypodermic needle, 27 with certain
provisos and exceptions not pertinent here. Again, as in the pro-
vision dealing with possession of narcotic drugs, the statute
makes no mention of criminal intent or knowledge of any par-
ticular facts. In a prosecution under that subsection, the Su-
preme Court in the Birdsell case reversed defendant's conviction
and ordered a new trial on the ground that the exclusion by the
trial judge of evidence that the defendant had never used the
syringe and needle for narcotics erroneously deprived the de-
fense of a substantial right. The court stated that "the defend-
ant was entitled to prove that his intent was anything but that
of violating the law ... he was entitled to prove his good faith
in possessing the prohibited articles." 28 The Birdsell decision
will be more fully analyzed in a student note in the next issue of
the Review.
MEANING OF "INTOXICATING LIQUORS"
In State v. Viator,29 the Supreme Court held that beer and
other malt beverages were not "intoxicating liquors" within the
meaning of Criminal Code Article 91, which forbids the sale of
intoxicating liquor to minors. The decision was based upon the
thesis that the definitions of the terms "liquors" and "malt bev-
erages" in the alcoholic beverages chapter of the Liquors - Al-
coholic Beverages Title of the Revised Statutes30 rendered those
terms mutually exclusive. The word "liquor" is therein defined
as any "distilled or rectified alcoholic beverage," while the
phrase "malt beverages" is defined as a beverage obtained "by
alcoholic fermentation." The effect of the Viator ruling was to
make the definitions found in the licensing provisions applicable
throughout the Revised Statutes, despite the fact that the defi-
nition section expressly states that the terms were being defined
"for the purposes of this Chapter." 31 (The chapter is entitled
"Collector of Revenue" and treats solely of dealers' permits and
taxation.)
A similar problem was presented in State v. Guimbellot8 2
where the court was called upon to determine whether the sale
27. LA. R.S. 40:962B (1950).
28. 232 La. 725, 731, 95 So.2d 290, 292 (1957).
29. 229 La. 882, 87 So.2d 115 (1956), discussed in Bennett, Legislation Af-
fecting Criminal Law and Procedure, 17 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 52, 54 (1956).
30. LA. R.S. 26:241 (1950).
31. Ibid.
32. 232 La. 1043, 95 So.2d 650 (1957).
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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
of beer in a restaurant on Sunday constituted a violation of the
Sunday Closing Law.8 Certain businesses, including restau-
rants, are specifically exempted from the Sunday Closing Law
"unless intoxicating liquors are sold on the premises."3 4 It was
argued by the state that a restaurant in which beer is sold is not
exempt from the closing law, because "intoxicating liquors are
sold on the premises." The majority of the court reasoned that
in view of the holding in the Viator case the restaurant, where
only beer was sold, did not sell "intoxicating liquors" on the
premises; and hence was not prevented from coming within the
restaurant exemption to the Sunday Closing Law. Justices Haw-
thorne and Hamiter dissented on the ground that the licensing
provision of the Alcoholic Beverages Title and the Sunday Clos-
ing Law were not in pari materia and therefore should not be
construed together. There is much to be said for the position
taken in the dissenting opinions. However, the issue was settled
in the Viator decision, which categorically held that the defi-
nition of "intoxicating liquors" in the revenue and licensing
chapter of Title 26 was applicable throughout the Revised
Statutes.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
CONTINUANCE - DUE DILIGENCE IN SECURING MATERIAL
WITNESS
The granting or refusing of a continuance rests "within the
sound discretion of the trial judge," 85 and exceptional circum-
stances are required before the trial judge's action will be held
to constitute an abuse of discretion. A motion for a continuance
to secure the presence of a key witness must "establish the exer-
cise of due diligence"8 6 in attempting to obtain the witness. It
was argued by the defense in State v. Blankenship37 that the trial
judge had abused his discretion in granting a continuance to the
state for the purpose of securing the presence of a witness who
had not been summoned by the district attorney, the theory being
that the absence of a summons showed lack of due diligence. The
Supreme Court rejected this argument, stating that "the issuing
of a subpoena for the material witness [in this case] ... would
have been a vain and useless gesture, for his address at that time
33. LA. R.S. 51:191, 192 (1950).
34. Id. at 51:192.
35. Id. at 15:320.
36. Id. at 15:322(3).
37. 231 La. 993, 93 So.2d 533 (1957).
(Vol. XVIII
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was unknown to the district attorney."3 Apparently, the result
would have been different if the district attorney had known the
witness' address, for the court has previously declared that .a
continuance should not be granted where no subpoena has been
issued for the missing witness.89
RECUSATION OF THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY
One of the grounds for the recusation of a district attorney
is that he "shall have been employed or consulted as attorney for
the accused before his election or appointment as district attor-
ney."140 In State v. Brazile4' the assistant district attorney had
recused himself because of prior participation in the trial for
the defense. The accused contended that the district attorney
should also be recused because of the possibility that privileged
information had been communicated to him by the assistant dis-
trict attorney. The court held that there was no ground for
recusation for "it is to be presumed that he [the assistant district,
attorney], as a member of the bar in good standing, has and will
respect the defendant's confidence. ' 42 An earlier case, 4 3 holding
that an assistant district attorney must recuse himself when the
district attorney does so, was distinguished on the ground that
the reverse of the situation does not obtain - recusation of the
subordinate would not require disqualification of the principal..
RECUSATION OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
Article 303 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
one of the grounds for the recusation of a trial judge is "his be-
ing related . . . to one of the attorneys or to the spouse of one
of the attorneys within the second degree. ' 44 In State v. Miller"
the trial judge recused himself on the ground that one of the
38. 231 La. 993, 996, 93 So.2d 533, 535 (1957).
39. State v. Elias, 230 La. 498, 503, 89 So.2d 51, 53 (1956) ; State v. Veillon,
49 La. Ann. 614-616, 21 So. 856, 857 (1897).
40. LA. R.S. 15:310 (1950).
41. 231 La. 90, 90 So.2d 789 (1956)..
42. Id at 94, 90 So.2d at 790.
43. State v. Buhler, 132 La. 1065, 62 So. 145 (1913). The Buhler decision was
based on Act 74 of 1886, which specially authorized the appointment of attorneys
to represent the state when the district attorney could not act. The rationale of
the decision was that Act 74 did not contemplate that an assistant district attor-
ney could act when the district attorney was recused. In this connection see LA.
R.S. 15:311 (1950), which supersedes La. Acts 1886, No. 74, p. 113, and provides
in part that "in the event of the recusation, absence or disability of any district
attorneY, the district judge shall appoint a lawyer having the' qualifications of a
district attorney of said district to act in the place of said recused district attor,.
ney, during the time of his absence or disability."
44. LA. R.S. 15:303(2) (1950).
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attorneys employed to assist the prosecution was a law partner
of the recusing trial judge's son-in-law. The trial judge observed
that while he knew that no prejudice to the defendant would re-
sult by his presiding it would be a dangerous practice "that could
be fruitful of much evil and one calculated to lower the respect
for and confidence in the Judiciary" to establish it as law that
a judge should not be recused under the circumstances of the case
at bar. The state's argument that recusation of the trial judge
should be strictly interpreted as limited by the statute was re-
jected by the Supreme Court, which held that employment of a
member of his son-in-law's law firm was tantamount to employ-
ment of the judge's son-in-law.
OBJECTIONS TO JURY VENIRE- ACTS OF DE FACTO JURY
COMMISSIONERS
In 1923 the Louisiana Supreme Court, in State v. Smith,46
overruled the prior jurisprudence and held that the general rule
that the acts of de facto officers cannot be challenged collaterally
was applicable to de facto jury commissioners. This principle
was the basis of the court's decision in State v. Kennedy.4 7 In
that case it was argued that because a member of the jury com-
mission had moved to another parish eight years prior to the
selection of the jury venire, the venire was illegally constituted.
The court rejected this contention, finding that the jury commis-
sioner in question was in actual possession of the office, dis-
charging. his duties under color of right and was therefore a
de facto member. As such his acts were not subject to collateral
attack. Although the court in the Kennedy case does not cite Ar-
ticle 203 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, adopted after the
Smith case, it would fully support the decision. That article pro-
vides that, in the absence of fraud or great wrong working ir-
reparable injury to the defendant, irregularities in the composi-
tion of the jury commission shall not be sufficient cause to chal-
lenge the legality of the jury venire.
COMPOSITION OF THE GRAND JURY - NEGRO REPRESENTATION
The now established rule that the absence of Negroes from
the grand jury does not of itself constitute systematic exclusion
45. 232 La. 541, 94 So.2d 661 (1957).
46. 153 La. 578, 96 So. 127 (1923). See also State v. Mitchell, 153 La. 586,
96 So. 130 (1923), a companion case.
47. 232 La. 755, 95 So.2d 301 (1957). See also the companion case of State v.
Weston, 232 La. 766, 95 So.2d 305 (1957).
[Vol. XVIII
9 CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE
of Negroes 48 was reaffirmed in State v. Eubanks.49 The case of
State v. Palmer ° involved an ingenious, but unsuccessful, effort
to urge racial discrimination in jury selection. In that case the
defendant attempted to draw a distinction between "persons of
color" and "Negroes," contending that the inclusion of "persons
of color" did not invalidate the argument that Negroes had been
systematically excluded from the grand jury. The court found
that the proof was sufficient to establish that the individuals
concerned were in fact members of the Negro race. The status
of the questioned jurors as "Negroes" had been established by
their birth certificates and by their testimony that they had al-
ways considered themselves to be Negroes, and that others had
always so regarded them. In overruling the defense's contention,
the judge aptly declared: "This novel effort to show discrimina-
tion is completely unrealistic. Appellant in effect is arguing that
there exist two or more classes of Negroes, and that a Negro of
any one of the so-called classes may allege that this class has been
discriminated against in the matter of drawing juries if mem-
bers of his particular class are excluded ... even though mem-
bers of other classes of Negroes have been included in the
venire." 51 After disposing of this hypertechnical argument, the
court held that the evidence in the Palmer case did not show
systematic exclusion, nor that there had been a systematic lim-
itation of the number of Negroes whose names were included on
the venire and jury lists so as to provide a mere token repre-
sentation.52
GRAND JURY - PRESENCE OF UNAUTHORIZED PERSON
Article 215 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
the sessions of the grand jury shall be secret, but that the dis-
trict attorney shall have free access to the sessions. Also, it is
provided that the district attorney may have the testimony re-
corded by a stenographer and the grand jury may employ an
interpreter when needed. The stenographer and the interpreter
must be sworn to keep the proceedings secret. In a recent appli-
cation of these provisions, 53 the Supreme Court held that the
48. Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950) ; Pierre v. Louisiana, 306 U.S. 354
(1939) ; Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) ; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100
U.S. 303 (1880).
49. 232 La. 289, 94 So.2d 262 (1957).
50. 232 La. 468, 94 So.2d 439 (1957).
51. Id. at 477, 94 So.2d at 443.
52. There were ten Negro names on the grand jury list of one hundred names,
and two Negroes were selected and served on the grand jury.
53. State v. Howard, 230 La. 327, 88 So.2d 387 (1956).
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use by the district attorney of a recording device instead of a
sworn stenographer to record the testimony was not a violation
of the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings since the record
"[did] not disclose that any unauthorized person appeared be-
fore the grand jury. '54 In State v. Revere" an investigator for
the district attorney attended the session of the grand jury at
which the defendant was indicted for the purpose of "monitor-
ing" a "Soundscribing" machine which was recording the testi-
mony of the witnesses. The defendant moved to quash the in-
dictment on the ground that his rights had been violated in that
the investigator was not one of the persons authorized by Article
215 to be present at grand jury sessions. The trial judge quashed
the indictment on that ground. On appeal, the state argued al-
ternatively that the investigator was present in the capacity of a
stenographer as contemplated in Article 215; that the specific
enumeration of persons did not imply that others were to be ex-
cluded; and that even if the investigator was an unauthorized
person this, in the absence of a showing of prejudice, was not
sufficient basis for vitiating the indictment. The Supreme Court
rejected each of these arguments and upheld the quashing of the
indictment. Chief Justice Fournet, after an extensive and
learned review of the historical background of the grand jury,
concluded that the requirement of secrecy of grand jury proceed-
ings is for the protection of both the state and persons accused
of crime. He points out that the assurance of secrecy promotes
full disclosures by witnesses testifying, prevents the defendant
from fabricating evidence to rebut the proposed testimony of
witnesses at the trial, keeps the good names of persons not in-
dicted from being besmirched, and otherwise generally fosters
the proper functioning of the grand jury. Since the accused is
not permitted to attend the sessions personally or through coun-
sel, his right to have the grand jury duly impaneled and con-
ducted according to law should be "rigorously protected." There-
fore, although the investigator was sworn to secrecy and was per-
forming a function similar to that of a stenographer recording
the witnesses' testimony, the majority of the court felt that the
practice offered too great a possibility for the exercise of undue
influence to be condoned. The court aptly observed that "the
problem of relaxing the secrecy of the grand jury proceedings is
incapable of rule-of-thumb solutions ... [but] if the secrecy re-
54. Id. at 331, 88 5o.2d at 388.
55. 232 La. 184, 94 So.2d 25 (1957), 18 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 186 (1957).
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quirement is regarded lightly it may foster the very practices
which the grand jury functions to avoid." 56
LONG FORM INDICTMENT - TRACING THE LANGUAGE OF THE
STATUTE
If the long form indictment is used, it "must state every fact
and circumstance necessary to constitute the offense, but it need
do no more, and it is immaterial whether the language of the
statute creating the offense, or words unequivocally conveying
the meaning of the statute, be used. ' 57 Generally, an indictment
which follows the language of the statute satisfies the constitu-
tional requirement" that a defendant be apprised of the nature
and cause of the accusation against him. Such an indictment,
however, is not sufficient to charge a crime which is defined in
general language covering a wide variety of criminal activity.
Thus, the Supreme Court has held that an information charging
that the defendants had "unlawfully possessed a mechanically
and/or manually operated device ... for the purpose of illegally
taking commercial fish" was insufficient although it tracked the
language of the statute.59 The court reasoned that since illegal
fishing devices may take any of a great variety of forms it was
necessary that the indictment state the specific facts on which
the charge was based. To charge the crime by simply tracing
the language of the statute in such a case did no more than state
a conclusion of law and could not truly be said to inform the
accused of the "nature and cause of the accusation." Similarly,
a charge of gambling has been held inadequate when it followed
the broad language of the multiple-offense gambling article
without specifying which of the many forms of gambling had
been committed.6 0 A different situation was presented in State
v. Green"l where the indictment charged that the defendant "did
with force and arms commit the crime of Simple Kidnapping as
defined by R.S. 14:45 in that he intentionally and forcibly seized
and carried [the prosecuting witness] from one place to another
without the consent of the [prosecuting witness]." Defense
counsel argued that the accused was entitled to be advised by the
indictment of the place from which or to which the prosecuting
witness was transported, the means of transportation, and the
56. 232 La. 184, 197, 94 So.2d 25, 30 (1957).
57. LA. R.S. 15:227 (1950).
58. LA. CONST. art. I, § 10.
59. State v. Blanchard, 226 La. 1082, 78 So.2d 181 (1955).
60. State v. Varnado, 208 La. 319, 23 So.2d 106 (1945).
61. 231 La. 1058, 93 So.2d 657 (1957).
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type of force used. The court held that the indictment, which
followed the language of the simple kidnapping article,6 2 was
sufficient since the statute itself adequately describes the acts
constituting the offense. The ruling appears to be correct. The
question is necessarily one of degree rather than rule of thumb.
The information which the defense sought in the Green case was
not such as was essential to inform the accused of the nature and
cause of the accusation, nor facts and circumstances necessary
to constitute the offense. Rather, it was the sort of information
which the bill of particulars is designed to supply upon request.
METHOD OF CHARGING ADULTS IN JUVENILE COURT
Louisiana Revised Statutes 13:1573 provides that in the trial
of adults coming within the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, the
proceeding "may be: (1) by affidavit of a district attorney or
any committing magistrate; or, with the approval of the district
attorney, by affidavit of a probation officer, and when made by
a district attorney, a committing magistrate, or probation offi-
cer may be on 'information or belief,' or (2) by bill of informa-
tion." In State v. Cooper,63 the Supreme Court held that the
word "may" refers to the alternative procedural methods listed,
and is not simply directory. Therefore, defendant's conviction
of criminal neglect of his minor child on an affidavit made and
signed by his wife was invalid.
JURORS - CHALLENGE FOR BIAS OR PREJUDICE
The Louisiana Constitution guarantees a defendant the right
to trial by an impartial jury.64 Accordingly, one of the special
causes for challenging a proffered juror, specifically stated in
the Code of Criminal Procedure, is that "he is not impartial, the
cause of his bias being immaterial."65 However, the prejudice
which will render a prospective juror subject to challenge for
cause must relate specifically to the defendant and the charge
being brought against him. Thus, the Supreme Court has held
that the fact that a prospective juror's place of business had been
burglarized four times does not automatically disqualify him on
the ground that he is prejudiced against one accused of bur-
glary.68 Also, in a case where a Negro was on trial for murder,
62. LA. R.S. 14:45 (1950).
63. 231 La. 187, 91 So.2d 5 (1956).
64. LA. CONST. art. I, § 9.
65. LA. R.S. 15:351(1) (1950).
66. State v. Martinez, 220 La. 899, 57 So.2d 888 (1952).
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the court held that "the mere fact, if it be true, that the father
of one of the jurors was killed by a Negro, and the further fact
that the accused was a Negro, would not disqualify that juror
from serving on the jury" trying the accused. 67 In State v.
Edwards,68 inwhich a Negro was charged with aggravated rape
of a white woman, a prospective juror was asked whether he
belonged to the Louisiana White Citizens' Council. He answered
that he did not, but volunteered that he believed in "white su-
premacy." Defense counsel's challenge of the juror on the
ground that he was prejudiced against the colored race was over-
ruled by the trial judge. The Supreme Court affirmed this
action, pointing out that the juror explained his statement say-
ing that he was referring to "white supremacy" solely in the
field of social relationships. Also, the juror further stated that
the fact that the defendant in that case was a Negro accused
of raping a white woman "would not interfere with his impartial
consideration of the law and the evidence." As thus safeguarded
the rights of the Negro defendant are adequately protected.
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION AS TO ATTITUDE ON CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT
Article 352 of the Code of Criminal Procedure grants to the
prosecution in a capital case the right to challenge for cause a
juror who has conscientious scruples against the infliction of
capital punishment. No corresponding right is granted by stat-
ute to the defense when a juror is conscientiously opposed to
rendering a qualified verdict, carrying only life imprisonment,
but the jurisprudence has recognized that it is only fair and just
that the defense be accorded a right to challenge for this cause.69
In interrogating the proffered juror on this matter, counsel are
not allowed to so phrase their questions that the juror is required
to commit himself in advance as to how he will exercise his pure-
ly discretionary power to render either a capital or a qualified
verdict. A dictum in a 1941 case had indicated that the court
would consider it improper to ask a juror whether he "would"
render a certain type of verdict, but that it would be proper to
ask a juror if he "could" do so. 70 However, in State v. Weston 71
67. State v. Allen, 203 La. 1016, 1024, 14 So.2d 821, 823 (1943).
68. 232 La. 577, 94 So.2d 674 (1957).
69. State v. Jackson, 227 La. 642, 80 So.2d 105 (1955) ; State v. Henry, 197
La. 999, 3 So.2d 104 (1941) ; State v. Henry, 196 La. 217, 198 So. 910 (1940).
70. In the second Henry decision, the court said that if the question had been
phrased in the latter manner the objection "would have no merit." 197 La. 999,
1010, 3 So.2d 104, 108 (1941).
71. 232 La. 766, 95 So.2d 305 (1957).
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the Supreme Court pointed out that either phraseology tends to
commit the juror as to his verdict, in the case of conviction, be-
fore he hears the evidence; and that neither is "strictly correct."
The court observed further that the pertinent inquiry is "not
what the juror would or could do but whether he has such a
prejudice against the type of crime charged that he is conscien-
tiously opposed, in the event of a finding of guilt, to a verdict
other than one with capital punishment. ' 72 The court's summary
of the voir dire examination of the prospective juror shows that
he was confused as to what was meant by a "qualified verdict,"
and by the "considerable interchange by counsel in his questions
to the juror as to what he 'would do' and 'could do.' "73 Even
where the less drastic "could do" term is carefully employed,
the Supreme Court appears to feel that a certain amount of com-
mitment in advance and confusion is likely to result.
PRESENT INSANITY - THE LUNACY COMMISSION
Where insanity as a bar to present trial becomes an issue in
the case, the procedure to be followed is set out in Article 267 of
the Code of Criminal Procedure.7 4 This article directs the trial
judge to fix a hearing to determine whether the defendant is
insane or mentally defective to the extent that he "is unable to
understand the proceedings against him or to assist in his de-
fense." When such hearing is ordered the court "may appoint"
a lunacy commission to examine the defendant and testify at the
hearing. The extent to which the Supreme Court feels bound by
the discretion of the trial judge in the matter of appointing a
lunacy commission was well demonstrated in the case of State v.
Bailey.7 5 In that case the defendant had been found presently
insane by three doctors, one of them a psychiatrist, composing
a sanity commission. The defendant was then sent to the hos-
pital which reported that the defendant was suffering from
severe mental illness and needed further treatment. The district
attorney, being convinced that the defendant was merely feign-
ing insanity, sent a copy of defendant's detailed confession to
each of the members of the lunacy commission and had the trial
judge call a hearing. At the hearing the commission, on the
strength of an appraisal of the statements made in the confes-
sion, reversed its previous finding of present insanity. Defense
72. 232 La. 766, 775, 95 So.2d 305, 308 (1957).
73. Ibid.
74. LA. R.S. 15:267 (1950).
75. 96 Bo.2d 34 (La. 1957).
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counsel moved for the appointment of a new commission, point-
ing out that two of the members had not re-examined the defend-
ant since the first report was made. The trial judge overruled
the motion and the Supreme Court upheld his ruling. While the
facts urged by defense counsel might appear to call for a new
lunacy commission, the Supreme Court's attitude toward the
matter appears to be warranted. The question of defendant's
present sanity is peculiarly a matter in which the trial judge's
personal observation of the defendant and examination of the
evidence would lend great weight to his determination.
Article 267 also governs the appointment of a lunacy com-
mission to examine the defendant whose present sanity and
ability to stand trial is in issue. It provides that the members
of the commission are "to testify at the hearing." There is no
stated requirement, as in Article 268, which provides for the
appointment of a lunacy commission where the defense of insan-
ity at the time of the crime is raised, that defense counsel must
be afforded an opportunity to interrogate the physicians ap-
pointed to the commission. In State v. Smith76 defense counsel
had moved prior to trial for the appointment of a lunacy commis-
sion to determine the present mental condition of the defendant.
The trial judge evidently believed that the defendant was sane.
However, prior to ruling on the motion he ordered the defendant
confined to the Louisiana State Hospital at Jackson for observa-
tion, naming two psychiatrists to examine him and to report on
their findings. The report was to the effect that there was no
evidence of insanity. Subsequently, defense counsel again moved
for the appointment of a lunacy commission, on the assumption
that the two appointed physicians did not constitute such a com-
mission. Defense counsel also asked the court for permission to
interrogate the two psychiatrists who were present in court.
The trial court overruled the motion and counsel reserved a bill
of exception. The Supreme Court held that, irrespective of the
views entertained by the lower court and counsel, a lunacy com-
mission had been, in effect, appointed; and that the refusal of
the trial judge to allow counsel to interrogate the physicians
was reversible error. The effect of this ruling is to make it
mandatory that physicians appointed by the trial judge to exam-
ine the accused's present mental condition be present at the hear-
ing and subject to interrogation by counsel. This is consistent in
purpose with the specific provision in Article 269 of the Code of
76. 231 La. 139, 90 So.2d 866 (1956)..
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Criminal Procedure that the lunacy commission's report as. to
present sanity must be "accessible" to both prosecution and de-
fense counsel.77
REMOVAL OF PERSONS FROM COURTROOM
It is within the discretion of the trial judge to exclude'per-
sons from the courtroom while a witness is testifying if. such a
step is necessary for the witness to testify freely.78 In State v.
Poindexter,7" defendant (an inmate of the Louisiana State Peni-
tentiary) pleaded self-defense in the killing of another inmate.
In presenting its case, the defendant wished to have another in-
mate of the prison testify and requested the court to remove
from the courtroom three penitentiary personnel, one on duty
and two spectators, because the witness could not speak freely
in their presence. The trial judge promptly refused the request,
without further inquiry, stating that "such an act by the court
would be highly irregular and against custom." On motion for
new trial, the defense attached an affidavit of the witness-
inmate in which he stated that he had refused to testify because
he was afraid to speak freely in the presence of the penitentiary
personnel and that his testimony related to threats made-by the
deceased to the defendant. In reversing the conviction the Su-
preme Court stated that the trial judge seemed to have felt bound
by what he termed "custom," and not to have realized that he
had discretion to exclude the penitentiary personnel. It is quite
likely, however, that even if the trial judge had clearly recog-
nized his discretion in the matter the Supreme Court would have
reversed on the ground that his action in refusing to remove the
prison personnel had been an abuse of discretion, in view of the
extreme importance of the intended testimony to the defendant's
plea of self defense.
REFERENCE BY DISTRICT ATTORNEY ON RETRIAL TO FORMER
CONVICTION
Some improper remarks of the district attorney constitute
reversible error unless "cured" by the trial judge's prompt ad-
77. Construed and applied in State v. Winfield, 222 La. 157, 62 So.2d 258(1952), discussed in The Work of the Loui8iana Supreme Court for the 1951-1952
Term - Criminal Law and Procedure, 14 LOUISIANA LAW R~viEw 235 (1953).
78. People v. Jelke, 308 N.Y. 56, 123 N.E.2d 769 (1954) ; Commonwealth v.
Principatti, 260 Pa. 587, 104 Atl. 53 (1918) ; State v. Damm, 62 8.D. 123, 252
N.W. 7, 104 A.L.R. 430 (1933).
79. 231 La. 630, 92 So.2d 390 (1956).
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monition to the jury that they are improper and are to be disre-
garded. Other improper remarks are so highly prejudicial that
they are deemed to be "incurable," or reversible error per se.80
In State v. Clark"1 the district attorney had referred, in his open-
ing statement on retrial, to the defendant's conviction at the first
trial. The trial judge overruled defense counsel's objection to
the remark and refused to instruct the jury that the statement
was improper and should be disregarded. In affirming the con-
viction the Supreme Court stated that "the defendant has failed
to show us in what respect his rights have been violated or his
cause prejudiced, and we can think of none.18 2 In essence, this
decision holds that the district attorney's uncalled for reference
to the former conviction is not sufficiently improper even to
necessitate an admonition to disregard by the trial judge and is
not to be treated as reversible error unless the defendant can
show specifically in what manner he has been prejudiced by the
remark. The court did concede, but without giving any real im-
port to the concession, that it would be "better practice" for the
trial judge in such cases to instruct the jury to disregard the re-
mark of the district attorney. Reference to a former conviction
would appear to involve a sufficient probability of prejudice to
constitute a prima facie violation of the mandate of Article 515
of the Code of Criminal Procedure that a retrial is to be con-
ducted "with as little prejudice to either party as if it had never
been tried" and at least to call for a special admonition by the
trial judge.8
REMARKS OF THE TRIAL JUDGE
Article 384 of the Code of Criminal Procedure provides that
"the judge shall not state or recapitulate the evidence, repeat the
testimony of any witness, nor give any opinion as to what facts
have been proved or refuted." Thus, any repetition of the testi-
mony of a witness by the trial judge is error, even if it appears
that the;trial judge was merely explaining his ruling on the ad-
missibility of evidence. Admitting that the remarks constitute
a repetition of testimony in contravention of Article 384, a ques-
tion still remains as to whether the error is sufficiently grave
80. See Comment, Improper Remarks of the District Attorney, 10 LOUISIANA
LAW REVIEW 486 (1950).
81. 231 La. 807, 93 So.2d 13 (1957).
82. Id. at 813,.93 So.2d at 15.
83. For' a complete and critical analysis of this problem, see Note, 18 Lomrsi-.
ANA LAW REvIEw 190 (1957).
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to entitle the defendant to a new trial.8 An examination of the
cases discloses that the court will look to the facts and cirdum-
stances surrounding the erroneous repetition of testimony by the
trial judge and decide whether the special state of facts War-
rants the granting of a new trial.8 5 In State v. Green," the trial
judge overruled defendant's objection to certain testimony, re-
marking that "it seems to me like its (sic) definitely all part of
res gestae, all together . . . he forced her in the car and forced
her to drive off with him." Upon defendant's exception to these
remarks the trial judge instructed the jury to disregard what he
had said but refused to declare a mistrial. The Supreme Court
set aside the conviction and remanded the case for a new trial,
ruling that "if an inference can be drawn from the objectionable
statement' that it is an expression or implication of an opinion
as to the guilt of the accused, the error cannot be cured by an
instruction to the jurors that the remarks be disregarded."'7
There is serious question as to the wisdom of a rule which, like
Article 384, prohibits the trial judge from repeating or recapitu-
lating the testimony and from expressing an opinion as to what
has been established by the proof. Orfield has aptly stated that
a rule which prohibits the trial judge from commenting upon the
evidence "deprives the jury of the opinion of the only impartial
expert present, and tends to debase trial by jury into a contest
of skill between opposing counsel." 88 The strong movement in
the states since 1910 to return to the common law rule permit-
ting the judge to comment upon the evidence 9 indicates a gen-
eral appreciation of this fact. Federal practice not only allows
the trial judge to comment upon the evidence but also allows him
to express his opinion on the merits of the case.90 In view of this
development, it appears that a critical reappraisal of the Louisi-
ana rule contained in Article 384 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure is in order. Such a rule bespeaks a lack of confidence in
the objectivity and competence of our trial judges.
84. State v. Nicolosi, 228 La. 65, 81 So.2d 771 (1955), discussed in The Work
of the Louisiana Supreme Court for the 1953-1954 Term - Criminal Law and
Procedure, 16 LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW 353 (1956).
85. Ibid. The Nicolosi opinion reviews the cases which have granted or denied
a new trial depending upon the particular facts of each case.
86. 231 La. 1058, 93 So.2d 657 (1957).
87. Id. at 1064, 93 So.2d at 659.
88. ORFIELD, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE FROM ARREST TO APPEAL 457 :(1947).
89. Id. at 458, and authorities cited.
90. Simmons v. United States, 142 U.S. 148 (1891); 9 HUGHES, FEDERAL
PRACTICE, JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURE § 7082 (1932). The same rule obtains
in Canadian practice. Riddell, Administration of Criminal Law in Canda, 17 J.
AM. Jun. Soc. 141, 144 (1934).
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RES JUDICATA IN CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS
The applicability of the doctrine of res judicata in criminal
prosecutions is generally recognized throughout the United
States.91 However, until the case of State v. Latil,92 there had ap-
parently been no authoritative declaration of the Louisiana posi-
tion on this question.9 3 In the Latil case, the defendant filed a
"plea of prescription 9 4 to the bill of information charging him
with unlawful possession of narcotics. Prescription was not
negatived in the bill, and the bill showed on its face that it had
been filed more than a year after the offense had allegedly oc-
curred. The trial judge refused to allow the state to amend the
bill to negative prescription and sustained the plea of prescrip-
tion. The state took no exception to this ruling. Subsequently,
another bill of information was filed which properly negatived
prescription. The defendant then filed a motion to quash, based
on the sustaining of the plea of prescription to the former bill.
The trial judge upheld the motion and quashed the bill. The Su-
preme Court, on rehearing, affirmed the trial judge's action,
holding that the sustaining of the plea of prescription was a rul-
ing on the merits calling for the application of the doctrine of
res judicata. This may be open to question. The only matter
actually determined, when the original charge was quashed, was
the fact that the information was prescribed on its face, since it
was filed more than a year after the crime and did not negative
prescription in any way. There had been no decision, on the
91. United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85 (1916). See cases collected
at 147 A.L.R. 992 (1943).
92. 231 La. 551, 92 So.2d 63 (1956).
93. In the case of Town of St. Martinville v. Dugas, 158 La. 262, 267, 103 So.
761, 763 (1925), it was said that "the doctrine of res judicata does not apply to
criminal prosecutions." However, as the court in the Latil case observed, the
statement was made without elaboration or citation of authority. Furthermore,
the statement was clearly dictum for the accused in the Dugas case was being tried
for a second and distinct offense rather than for the same offense.
94. Justice Hamiter, who authored the original opinion, argued in his dissent
to the opinion on rehearing that under Article 288 of the Code of Criminal Pro-
cedure "defects in indictments can be urged before verdict only by demurrer or a
motion 'to quash." (emphasis added), and therefore although the plea was styled
a plea of prescription it was only a demurrer or a motion to quash. And, he con-
tinued, Article 15 provides that if an indictment is quashed, annulled, set aside,
or nolle prosequied, then prescription begins to run against another bill.
The court could, however, have found support for its position in the case of
State v. Shiro, 143 La. 842, 79 So. 426 (1918), in which the Supreme Court re-
fused to deprive a defendant of the full benefit of his double jeopardy plea, despite
the fact that the acquittal had resulted from trial errors in favor of the accused.
Leche, J., concluded with this cryptic statement: "[A]ll judges are liable to err,
and when they do so to the advantage of the accused our system of criminal pro-
cedure seldom offers the state an opportunity to have the error corrected." Id. at
843, 79 So. at 427.
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merits, as to whether the offense was actually prescribed. How-
ever, the importance of the Latil decision lies in the fact that the
Louisiana Supreme Court, in an extensive opinion which reviews
the authorities on the subject, has adopted the almost universal
rule that res judicata applies to criminal as well as to civil pro-
ceedings.
JURISDICTION ON APPEAL- SUPREME COURT
In misdemeanor cases the state cannot appeal from a trial
judge's order quashing an information unless the judgment is
based wholly on a ruling that the statute involved is unconstitu-
tional and the record affirmatively discloses that basis.9 5 In
State v. Scallan6 defendant was charged with a misdemeanor
(using unsealed and false weighing or measuring device). The
defense filed a motion to quash on the grounds that (1) the in-
dictment did not set forth any crime known to the laws of this
state and (2) the statute was unconstitutional. The trial court
sustained the motion to quash without stating the basis for his
ruling. The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, following its
prior ruling that "where the judgment appealed from may have
been predicated, either upon the ground that the case presented
was not within the law relied on, or upon the ground that such
law is unconstitutional, it will not be assumed, for the purposes
of the jurisdiction on appeal, that the latter was the ground
adopted.'9
7
95. State v. Johnson, 176 La. 371, 145 So. 773 (1933) ; State v. Clement, 178
La. 93, 150 So. 842 (1933).
96. 231 La. 471, 91 So.2d 761 (1956).
97. 231 La. 471, 473, 91 So.2d 761, 762 (1956), quoting from State v. Yazoo
& M.V.R.R., 116 La. 189, 40 So. 630 (1906).
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